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DOES THE CHARTER FOLLOW THE FLAG?    






Jacques Maritain, the noted philosopher and political thinker and a principal drafter of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, once contended that “political philosophy 
must get rid of the word, as well as the concept, of Sovereignty.”1 He reasoned as much 
“not because [sovereignty] is an antiquated concept,” or “because the concept of 
Sovereignty creates insuperable difficulties and theoretical entanglements in the field of 
international law,” but because “this concept is intrinsically wrong and bound to mislead 
us if we keep on using it.”2 Maritain’s proposal may have been exceedingly bold and his 
criticisms perhaps too harsh, but they nonetheless resonate over half a century later in 
light of the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent decision in R v Hape.3 
The judgment in Hape, where the Court concluded on the basis of international law, 
including principles of sovereign equality and comity, that the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms4 cannot apply extraterritorially, has been described as “deeply 
problematic on many levels.”5 Criticisms from scholars of both constitutional law6 and 
international law7 have been far from reserved. John Currie, for example, has assailed 
the Court for giving Canadian government officials “a blank cheque … to violate the 
Charter with impunity as long as they do so abroad.”8 Given Hape’s purported 
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1 Jacques Maritain, Man and the State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951) at 29. 
2 Ibid. 
3 2007 SCC 26, [2007] 2 SCR 292 [Hape]. 
4 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 
[Charter]. 
5 John Currie, “Khadr’s Twist on Hape: Tortured Determinations of the Extraterritorial Reach of 
the Canadian Charter” (2008) 46 Can YB Int’l Law 307 at 316 [Currie, “Tortured 
Determinations”]. 
6 See e.g., Kent Roach, “R. v. Hape Creates Charter-Free Zones for Canadian Officials Abroad” 
(2007) 53 Crim LQ 1. 
7 See e.g., Amir Attaran, “Have Charter, Will Travel? Extraterritoriality in Constitutional Law and 
Canadian Exceptionalism” (2008) 87 Can Bar Rev 515; Currie, “Tortured Determinations,” supra 
note 5. 
8 Currie, ibid. 
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grounding in principles of international law, it is not without some irony that the 
decision has been criticized for its reliance on an “incomplete—frankly, incorrect—view 
of international law,”9 the result of which is that the Court has “sacrifice[d] a basic 
aspect of Canadian sovereignty itself: namely expectations that Canadian officials 
respect Charter values when they act in their official capacity at home or abroad.”10 
Equally troubling as the substantive outcome of Hape, however, is the criticism of the 
approach adopted by the Court in articulating its reasoning. The majority opinion has 
been faulted for its largely technical analysis of international law without any 
meaningful discussion of “the basic values and aspirations of the Charter or what the 
Charter means to Canada’s image of itself, especially when it presents itself to the 
world.”11 Moreover, the Court is criticized for its “radical” approach to reconciling its 
own precedents, forsaking a scalpel in favour of a sledgehammer. The decision in Hape 
“does not build on or attempt to distinguish prior precedents in this area but rather rejects 
them, as a critic working outside of the system might do,” Kent Roach has argued, 
concluding that “[t]his is not the way that judges should develop the law.”12 
The purpose of this essay is to accept the invitation implicit in these criticisms by 
revisiting Hape and asking anew: Does the Charter follow the flag?13 The importance of 
this question is self-evident. The Charter is a cherished part of Canada’s Constitution; 
the two decades of jurisprudence that have sought to shape and give life to its amorphous 
protections mark the signal achievement of the Supreme Court of Canada in its modern 
era. More pragmatically though, as Amir Attaran has suggested, “Hape is an imperfect 
judgment that cannot last.”14 If that is indeed the case, as the Court’s more recent 
jurisprudence strongly suggests it is, then an analysis of potential alternatives serves to 
advance discussion of this important question. 
In this paper, I conclude that the Court’s reasoning in Hape rests on a flawed 
understanding of international law. Indeed, a more searching analysis reveals that there 
is ample basis to conclude that extraterritorial application of the Charter—far from being 
anathema to international law—is in harmony with emerging principles of state 
responsibility. An analysis of foreign jurisprudence provides added support for this 
conclusion. The question of international law aside, however, fidelity to the principles 
underlying the Charter necessitates an interpretation that contemplates extraterritorial 
application.  
This paper is divided into three parts. In Part I, I review the decision in Hape on its own 
terms, limiting my discussion to those aspects of international law discussed by the 
Court itself. I attempt to show that the Court’s conclusions on Canada’s extraterritorial 
                                                       
9 Attaran, supra note 7 at 523. 
10 Roach, supra note 6 at 1. 
11 Ibid at 4. 
12 Ibid at 3. 
13 The diction of this question, and the title for this paper, were inspired by the title of an excellent 
book on the same topic in the American context: See Kal Raustiala, Does the Constitution Follow 
the Flag? The Evolution of Territoriality in American Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2009). 
14 Attaran, supra note 7 at 1. 
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jurisdiction and the authority of Parliament are based on a flawed assessment of 
international law. I also argue that the Court’s subsequent decision to recognize an 
exception to those conclusions exposes fatal contradictions within the Hape doctrine. In 
Part II, I propose a different way to look at the question of the Charter’s extraterritorial 
application through the lens of sovereign responsibility. I review several judgements of 
foreign high courts that show why this alternative approach is more consonant with 
emerging principles of international law. Finally, in Part III, I endeavour to demonstrate 
how the approach offered in Part II can be reconciled with the Charter and Hape, 
offering my view of how the Court might proceed in the future by building on the 
principal minority opinion in Hape itself. 
I. THE DECISION 
The judgement in Hape was at once unified and fractured. The case concerned the 
question of whether the Charter applied to searches of the accused’s office premises in 
the Turks and Caicos conducted jointly by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and local 
police.15 The accused brought an application in an Ontario court to exclude evidence 
collected from the searches on the basis that the searches, allegedly conducted without 
local warrants, infringed his section 8 rights against unreasonable search and seizure.16 
On final appeal, the nine justices of the Court were unanimous in judgement—there had 
been no violation of Charter rights in this case—but three separate opinions offered 
three separate sets of reasons as to why. The crux of the debate focussed on the meaning 
of section 32(1) of the Charter, which governs its application: 
32. (1) This Charter applies 
(a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect of all matters 
within the authority of Parliament including all matters relating to the 
Yukon Territory and Northwest Territories; and 
(b) to the legislature and government of each province in respect of all 
matters within the authority of the legislature of each province.17 
Justice LeBel, writing for the five-justice majority,18 articulated an entirely new 
approach to constitutional extraterritoriality based largely on conclusions as to 
                                                       
15 Hape, supra note 3 at paras 3-6. 
16 Ibid at paras 11-14; Charter, supra note 4, s 8 (“Everyone has the right to be secure against 
unreasonable search or seizure”). See also R v Hape, 2002 CanLII 4900 (Sup Ct), aff’d 201 OAC 
126 (available on CanLii) (CA). 
17 Charter, ibid, s 32(1). 
18 Hape, supra note 3 at paras 1-122. 
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international law and in doing so rejected several of the Court’s key precedents.19 Justice 
Bastarache, writing for himself and two other justices,20 declined to follow Justice LeBel 
in his emphasis on international law and instead articulated a new approach that, though 
grounded in the Court’s prior precedents, also sought to reform them. Finally, Justice 
Binnie, writing for himself,21 concluded that Hape was a straightforward case that could 
fit within the Court’s earlier precedents and declined to use the occasion to engage in 
wholesale reform of the Court’s doctrine. 
A. CONCLUSIONS BASED ON JURISDICTION 
The majority opinion in Hape presents two concepts in international law—one a binding 
principle, the other non-binding—and suggests that both are instrumental to a proper 
interpretation of section 32(1). The first concept is sovereign equality, which is described 
as a “cornerstone of the international legal system.”22 According to Justice LeBel, the 
concept’s “foundational principles—including non-intervention and respect for the 
territorial sovereignty of foreign states—cannot be regarded as anything less than firmly 
established rules of customary international law.”23 In other words, a violation of the 
principle of sovereign equality is a violation of international law.24 The second concept 
is comity, which includes the “rules observed by states in their mutual relations out of 
politeness, convenience and goodwill, rather than strict legal obligation.”25 In contrast to 
sovereign equality, “comity is more a principle of interpretation than a rule of law, 
because it does not arise from formal obligations.”26 Comity, in other words, is non-
binding. 
The distinction between the binding nature of the principle of sovereign equality and the 
non-binding principle of comity is of much importance to the judgement in Hape. As a 
result of its non-binding nature, the notion of comity “does not offer a rationale for 
condoning another state’s breach of international law” because, as the majority 
                                                       
19 There is some debate as to whether crucial precedents—including most significantly R v Cook, 
which was previously the leading case on application of the Charter extraterritorially—were in 
fact overruled or not. The official case report suggests Cook was “distinguished,” but several 
observers, including Binnie J in his opinion in Hape, have concluded that Cook was overturned 
sub silento. See ibid at para 182 (Binnie J, concurring); Currie, “Tortured Determinations,” supra 
note 5 at 313; Roach, supra note 6 at 1; H. Scott Fairley, “International Law Comes of Age: Hape 
v. The Queen” (2008) 87 Can Bar Rev 229 at 230, 238. 
 At least one scholar, however, has noted that the fact that Cook was not overruled 
explicitly is significant, especially to those who would like to abandon Hape and return to the core 
of the doctrine Cook espoused. See Attaran, supra note 7 at 547. See also R v Cook, [1998] 2 SCR 
597, 164 DLR (4th) 1 [Cook]. 
20 Hape, ibid at paras 123-80. 
21 Ibid at paras 181-92. 
22 Ibid at para 46. 
23 Ibid [emphasis added]. 
24 Ibid at para 40ff. 
25 Ibid at para 47 [emphasis added]. 
26 Ibid. 
 Does the Charter Follow the Flag? Vol 20 106 
concludes, “the need to uphold international law may trump the principle of comity.”27 It 
is worth pausing here to observe a few points which will have special relevance later in 
this paper. First, note the tentative nature of this conclusion: comity “may” be trumped; 
crucially, it is not always trumped in the face of an international law violation. Second, 
the question of whether a given state is exempted from adhering to principles of comity 
toward another state depends on that second state’s adherence to international law. And 
third, a hierarchy of norms is apparent: In sharp contrast to comity, sovereignty equality, 
as the “the linchpin of the whole body of international legal standards,” is a principle that 
is generally inviolable.28  
Having laid down these foundational principles, the majority in Hape then discusses the 
concept of jurisdiction. Drawing on well-known treatises, the Court observes that there 
are three distinct forms. The first, prescriptive jurisdiction, concerns “the power to make 
rules, issue commands or grant authorizations that are binding upon persons and 
entities.”29 The second, enforcement jurisdiction, is “the power to use coercive means to 
ensure that rules are followed, commands are executed or entitlements are upheld.”30 
The third and final form, adjudicative jurisdiction, relates to “the power of a state’s 
courts to resolve disputes or interpret the law through decisions that carry binding 
force.”31 
To illustrate the application of the above forms of jurisdiction, the majority places much 
reliance on—but misinterprets a key aspect of—the seminal case of the SS Lotus.32 Some 
background may be helpful: The case involved a collision between French and Turkish 
steamers on the high seas. The Turkish vessel was very heavily damaged and thus sank, 
killing eight. The French steamer, though badly damaged, managed to sail to the nearby 
Turkish port city of Constantinople. Soon after its arrival, however, the ship’s captain 
was arrested on charges of involuntary manslaughter. He was ultimately tried and 
convicted of various offenses under Turkish law by a Turkish court in Turkey. These 
facts afforded the Permanent Court of International Justice (“PCIJ”) an opportunity to 
offer its understanding of extraterritorial jurisdiction in its prescriptive, enforcement and 
adjudicative forms.  
The PCIJ adopted a narrow view of enforcement jurisdiction, which was cited by the 
Court in Hape: 
Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a 
State is that—failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary—it 
may not exercise its power [i.e., enforcement jurisdiction] in any form in 
                                                       
27 Ibid at para 51. 
28 Ibid at para 40. Of course, this assertion is limited to the context of the extraterritorial 
application of a given state’s laws in another state. The UN Security Council, under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter, is capable of authorizing military action that would obviously violate the target 
state’s sovereignty. The UN-backed military action in Libya in early 2011, for example, was 
conducted under such authority. See UNSC, 2011, 6498th Mtg, UN Doc S/Res/1973 (2011). 
29 Hape, supra note 3 at para 58. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 The Case of the SS “Lotus” (France v Turkey) (1927), PCIJ (Ser A), No 10 [Lotus]. 
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the territory of another State. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly 
territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State outside its territory except by 
virtue of a permissive rule derived from international custom or from a 
convention.33 
The crucial point here is that the default position as it relates to enforcement jurisdiction 
is that a state may not exercise such jurisdiction outside its own territory. An 
exception—a “permissive rule”—would be consent of the state whose territory the other 
state sought to act.34 The crux of Lotus, however, was not enforcement jurisdiction, as 
recall that the French ship voluntarily entered Turkish territory by docking in 
Constantinople; Turkey was not seeking to enforce any of its laws on French territory.35 
The real issue in Lotus thus was whether “Turkey was able to extend the reach of its 
penal laws, that is, its prescriptive jurisdiction, to events occurring outside Turkish 
territory, on the high seas.”36 Here, the PCIJ adopted a “quite liberal”37 approach. In the 
very next paragraph after the one quoted above—but one curiously passed over by the 
Hape majority—the PCIJ concluded: 
It does not, however, follow that international law prohibits a State from 
exercising jurisdiction in its own territory, in respect of any case which 
relates to acts which have taken place abroad, and in which it cannot rely 
on some permissive rule of international law. Such a view would only be 
tenable if international law contained a general prohibition to States to 
extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to 
persons, property and acts outside their territory, and if, as an exception to 
this general prohibition, it allowed States to do so in certain specific cases. 
But this is certainly not the case under international law as it stands at 
present. Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that 
States may not extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of 
their courts to persons, property and acts outside their territory, it leaves 
them in this respect a wide measure of discretion, which is only limited in 
certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State 
remains free to adopt the principles which it regards as best and most 
suitable.38 
Put simply, a state must rely on a permissive rule to assert enforcement jurisdiction. In 
sharp contrast, however, a state need only ensure there is no prohibitive rule when it 
seeks to assert prescriptive or adjudicative jurisdiction. In other words, the “starting 
                                                       
33 Ibid at 18 [emphasis added]. 
34 Attaran, supra note 7 at 524. 
35 John H Currie, Public International Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2008) at 339-40 [Currie, Public 
International Law]. 
36 Ibid at 340. 
37 Ibid at 339. 
38 Lotus, supra note 32 at 18-19 [emphasis added]. 
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premise, when it comes to the extent of the states’ prescriptive and adjudicative 
jurisdiction, is essentially permissive.”39 
The majority in Hape actually shows some appreciation for the territorial nexus 
distinction between prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction on the one hand, and 
enforcement jurisdiction on the other, though it does so with less sweep. In the 
majority’s view, prescriptive jurisdiction is “primarily territorial,” but there are 
“exceptions.”40 Nationality jurisdiction, for example, allows a state to “regulate [i.e., 
prescribe, in the language of Lotus] and adjudicate regarding actions committed by its 
nationals in other countries, provided enforcement of the rules takes place when those 
nationals are within the state’s own borders.”41 Crucially, the Court recognizes that such 
extraterritorial prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction, without any extraterritorial 
enforcement jurisdiction, does not offend either the principle of sovereign equality or 
comity.42 Indeed, the majority cited several crimes in Canada that reflect extraterritorial 
prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction.43 
Though one can quibble with the majority’s selective adherence to the principles 
enunciated in Lotus,44 the real problem in Hape comes with the Court’s conclusion that 
“applying the Charter to activities that take place abroad implicates the extraterritorial 
                                                       
39 Currie, Public International Law, supra note 35 at 340. 
 It is worth noting, however, that some states, acting through domestic courts, have 
voluntarily narrowed the scope of their extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction. For example, 
European governments have in the past have protested American attempts to extend the 
applicability of the Sherman Antitrust Act to cover all anticompetitive agreements made on 
European soil. See 15 USC § 1 (2006). This has led the US Supreme Court to adopt a “rule of 
reason” and an “effects doctrine” whereby it will query whether there is a reasonable basis for the 
US government to exercise its extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction even if such jurisdiction is 
enforced only domestically. See Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008) at 309. 
 As Brownlie has noted, however, the European protests are somewhat ironic given that 
European laws often mirror American ones in their extraterritorial prescriptive reach. The UK, for 
example, recently adopted its own equivalent of the American Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 
criminalizing domestically the bribing of foreign officials on foreign soil. Notably, the UK law 
goes much further than its US counterpart and has been described as “the FCPA on steroids.” 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 USC §§ 78dd-1ff (2006); Bribery Act 2010 (UK), 2010 c 23, s 
6; and Dionne Seacrey, “UK Law on Bribes Has Firms in a Sweat” The Wall Street Journal (28 
December 2010), online: The Wall Street Journal 
<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704118504576034080908533622.html>. 
 All the protests aside, international law is clear that such extraterritorial prescriptive 
jurisdiction is legal. See generally, Brownlie at 300-8, Currie, Public International Law at 339-54, 
Malcolm N Shaw, International Law, 6th ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) at 
649-651. 
40 Hape, supra note 3 at para 60. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid at para 64. 
43 E.g., hijackings of Canadian aircraft while abroad, war crimes and other crimes against 
humanity. Ibid at para 66, citing R v Terry, [1996] 2 SCR 207 at para 15, 135 DLR (4th) 214 
[Terry]. 
44 See note 40, above. 
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enforcement of Canadian law.”45 The majority’s conclusion that extraterritorial 
application of the Charter necessitates, or at least results in, impermissible 
extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction is flummoxing.46 Professor Currie, for example, 
has argued that the Court has “fatally confused” the concepts of prescriptive and 
adjudicative jurisdiction, on the one hand, with enforcement jurisdiction:47 The key 
paragraph on this point from the Court’s judgement should be read in full: 
The powers of prescription and enforcement are both necessary to 
application of the Charter. The Charter is prescriptive in that it sets out 
what the state and its agents may and may not do in exercising the state's 
powers. Prescription is not in issue in the case at bar, but even so, the 
Charter cannot be applied if compliance with its legal requirements cannot 
be enforced. Enforcement of compliance with the Charter means that 
when state agents act, they must do so in accordance with the requirements 
of the Charter so as to give effect to Canadian law as it applies to the 
exercise of the state power at issue. However, as has already been 
discussed, Canadian law cannot be enforced in another state’s territory 
without that state's consent. Since extraterritorial enforcement is not 
possible, and enforcement is necessary for the Charter to apply, 
extraterritorial application of the Charter is impossible.48 
As Currie has observed, such reasoning makes an unfounded logical leap between the 
premise that Canada has no enforcement jurisdiction over a given matter and the 
conclusion that the matter itself therefore falls outside Canada’s prescription jurisdiction. 
If this is true, the result entails “collapsing the distinction between prescriptive and 
enforcement jurisdiction entirely.”49  
The majority’s reasoning seems to presuppose that the Charter enforcement in cases 
where a potential rights infringement occurs abroad requires extraterritorial enforcement. 
But this view is demonstrably false based on the Court’s own jurisprudence. Less than 
eight months after its decision in Hape, a unanimous Court in Canada (Justice) v Khadr 
concluded that the Government of Canada’s extraterritorial actions had breached a 
Canadian citizen’s Charter rights and thus crafted a remedy that it was able to enforce 
                                                       
45 Hape, supra note 3 at para 33. 
46 See e.g., Attaran, supra note 7 at 524-29; Currie, “Tortured Determinations,” supra note 5 at 31; 
James Stribopoulos, “The Charter’s Unstated Territorial Limits: R. v. Hape” TheCourt.ca (8 June 
2007), online: TheCourt.ca <http://www.thecourt.ca/2007/06/08/the-charters-unstated-territorial-
limits-r-v-hape/>. 
 Curiously, even a commentator who is generally supportive of the Court’s jurisprudence 
in this area has been unable to explain its focus on enforcement jurisdiction. See Jane M Arbour, 
“Canada v. Khadr: Reflections on the Use of International Law in the Repatriation Litigation” 
(2010) 51 SCLR (2d) 275 at 277. 
47 Currie, “Tortured Determinations,” ibid at 317. 
48 Hape, supra note 3 at para 85. 
49 Currie, “Tortured Determinations,” supra note 5 at 318, n 61. 
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intraterritorially.50 There was no discussion in Khadr of an inability to enforce the 
judgement extraterritorially, nor was there any need for such a discussion. Quite simply, 
there is no exercise of enforcement jurisdiction when a Canadian court applies the 
Charter, in a Canadian court proceeding, to the extraterritorial actions of Canadian 
officials: “[A] court sitting only in Canada (and thus exercising enforcement jurisdiction 
only in Canada) and applying a Canadian rule of law to events occurring abroad is 
defining the prescriptive reach of that rule, not enforcing it abroad.”51 Examples of what 
actually constitutes extraterritorial enforcement confirm this view: Arresting or detaining 
persons in a foreign jurisdiction, serving a summons, mounting a police investigation, 
and ordering the production of document—absent the consent of the local sovereign—
would all constitute exercises of enforcement jurisdiction.52 But a Charter remedy, as the 
decision in Khadr clearly illustrates, involves no such impermissible act. 
Given the majority opinion’s extensive analysis of the difference between prescriptive 
and adjudicative jurisdiction on the one hand, and enforcement jurisdiction on the other, 
it is difficult to comprehend how the Court reached the conclusion that an exercise of 
any legitimate extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction was per se impermissible 
extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction. One possible explanation may be an unspoken 
fear that a Canadian court’s domestic enforcement of a Charter remedy concerning 
extraterritorial acts after the fact would likely lead in the future to a kind of indirect 
extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction before the fact when the Canadian government 
alters its behaviour.53 For example, the judgement in Khadr will likely influence the 
Canadian government’s behaviour abroad in similar situations in the future, which could 
perhaps be construed as a kind of indirect extraterritorial enforcement by Canadian 
courts. By this reasoning, one might surmise that the Court was wary of the possibility 
that requiring Canadian officials to act in conformance with the Charter while abroad 
would potentially lead to Canadian demands of local governments to run their affairs in a 
particular way, thus running afoul of the principles of sovereign equality and comity. 
Setting aside for a moment whether Canada is actually in a position to dictate to any 
government how it should run its affairs, I can find no basis in international law to 
support a conclusion that domestic enforcement of an extraterritorial act subject to 
prescriptive jurisdiction can indirectly lead to impermissible extraterritorial enforcement. 
More importantly, however, the Court offers no principle or precedent that would 
support such a conclusion. 
The minority in Hape recognizes that the issue of extraterritorial enforcement 
jurisdiction does not actually arise. Justice Bastarache notes that the government has a 
                                                       
50 Canada (Justice) v Khadr, 2008 SCC 28 at para 31, [2008] 2 SCR 125 [Khadr]. The same 
conclusion was reached as recently as last year in Canada (Prime Minister) v Khadr, 2010 SCC 3, 
[2010] 1 SCR 44 [Khadr II]. 
51 Currie, “Tortured Determinations,” supra note 5 at 317 [emphasis in original].  
52 Brownlie, supra note 39 at 309. 
53 The majority could be understood as making this point in Hape when it said, in passing, that: 
“Here, to apply the Charter to the investigation in Turks and Caicos would of necessity compel 
compliance by the foreign authorities, thus impinging on their sovereign authority.” For the 
reasons discussed above, however, such a concern is without merit. Supra note 3 at para 29 
[emphasis added]. 
Vol 20   Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies 111 
choice when faced with Charter requirements: It can choose not to act abroad at all or it 
can negotiate with the local government for Charter-compliant standards of conduct 
(say, insisting that an accused be afforded an attorney). The former option, as the Hape 
majority ostensibly fails to appreciate, relies on the consent of the host nation and thus 
offends neither sovereign equality nor comity. As the minority opinion concludes: “By 
putting the onus squarely on Canadian authorities to not exercise control if the 
investigatory action is not Charter compliant, we never have to ask whether the 
application of the Charter results in an interference with sovereign authority of a foreign 
state.”54  
Interpreted properly, fidelity to the principles of sovereign equality and comity as 
recognized in international law does not require that a state compromise its 
extraterritorial prescriptive or adjudicative jurisdiction, though it does require 
recognition that extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction, as a general rule, is 
impermissible. For these legal concepts to have any meaning, they must be distinct. The 
logic in Hape, however, suggests that extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction follows 
inexorably from extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction and is thus flawed, for it denies 
each concept of distinct utility. As Khadr clearly illustrates, Canada can apply the 
Charter to governmental acts committed abroad through its right to exercise 
extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction even though it lacks extraterritorial enforcement 
jurisdiction. Once this logic is recognized, a central basis for the holding in Hape 
“evaporates.”55 
B. CONCLUSIONS BASED ON THE AUTHORITY OF PARLIAMENT 
Building on the foundation established in its discussion of the principles of sovereign 
equality, the majority opinion in Hape also concludes that extraterritorial application of 
the Charter is impossible because such application is outside the authority of Parliament. 
This conclusion is closely related to the first conclusion based on jurisdiction, but is in 
fact distinct. Recall that the Court arrived at its first conclusion as to the Charter’s 
applicability by reasoning—incorrectly, as I endeavoured to show above—that 
extraterritorial application of the Charter is impossible because the principles of 
sovereign equality and comity counsel against extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction. 
Such jurisdiction, in the majority’s view, is a necessary precondition for extraterritorial 
application. 
The second conclusion is arrived at by extending those principles and anchoring them in 
the actual text of the Charter. Recall that section 32(1) limits application of the Charter 
to “all matters within the authority of Parliament.” But, the majority observes, “[a] 
criminal investigation in the territory of another state cannot be a matter within the 
authority of Parliament or the provincial legislatures, because they have no jurisdiction 
to authorize enforcement abroad.”56 This focus on extraterritorial enforcement 
jurisdiction as the only form of jurisdiction that matters in establishing what is within the 
                                                       
54 Ibid at para 162. 
55 Currie, “Tortured Determinations,” supra note 5 at 318. 
56 Ibid at para 94. 
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“authority of Parliament” echoes the Court’s earlier reasoning: Since such jurisdiction, in 
light of the Court’s conclusions regarding the binding principle of sovereign equality, 
violates international law, the Court now concludes that any activity necessitating such 
jurisdiction—all matters outside Canadian territory—is for that reason outside the 
authority of Parliament.57 The Charter, hence, cannot not apply. 
The Court’s second conclusion cannot be sustained. Putting aside that it is fundamentally 
counterintuitive,58 the lack of extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction, as I attempted to 
explain above, in no way forecloses Parliament’s ability to exercise extraterritorial 
prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction. Even accepting for a moment that international 
law should have some bearing on the interpretation of Canada’s Constitution in this 
manner, both forms of jurisdiction are plainly legal in international law and hence 
“within the authority of Parliament.”59 Any contrary conclusion would throw the 
constitutionality of laws like the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, which 
the majority accepted as constitutional,60 into doubt. By the same reasoning, and as 
Khadr demonstrates, there is no need to exercise extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction 
to provide a remedy for a breach of Charter rights.61 The argument that the Charter’s 
extraterritorial application is outside the authority of Parliament thus necessarily fails if 
the proposition that extraterritorial application in no way requires extraterritorial 
enforcement jurisdiction is accepted. 
More alarming, however, is the majority’s emphasis on narrowing the scope of section 
32(1) based on its understanding of international law. In effect, though the Court 
                                                       
57 Hape, supra note 3 at para 94. The minority, however, disagreed: “I would disagree with LeBel 
J. that if one cannot enforce Canadian law outside Canada the matter falls outside the authority of 
Parliament and the provincial legislatures under s. 32(1)” at para 160. 
58 If the activities of Canadian officials are outside the authority of Parliament, whose authority are 
they under? The minority raises this point as well. See Hape, ibid at para 161 (“If the investigative 
activities of Canadian police officers abroad do not fall under ‘matters that are within the authority 
of Parliament or the provincial legislatures’, then the officers would have no jurisdiction 
whatsoever to be conducting investigations abroad. Clearly, they do”). 
59 The Constitution of Canada disabuses one of any remaining ambiguity on this point: “It is 
hereby declared and enacted that the Parliament of a Dominion [i.e., Canada] has full power to 
make laws having extra-territorial operation.” Statute of Westminster (1931) UK 22 and 23 Geo 5, 
c 4, s 3. The power to violate international law is thus among the “well-settled axioms of Canadian 
constitutional law.” Currie, “Tortured Determinations,” supra note 5 at 319. The Hape majority 
does not dispute this conclusion. See note 63, below. 
60 Hape, supra note 3 at para 66, citing Terry, supra note 44 at para 15. 
61 See discussion at Part I(A), above. 
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recognizes that Parliament can legitimately craft statutes that violate international law,62 
the Court seems to have gone out of its way to interpret the clear language in section 
32(1) to ensure that the Charter does not. The basis for the Court’s conclusion 
concerning the interpretation of section 32(1) stems from its teaching that “[i]n 
interpreting the scope of application of the Charter, the courts should seek to ensure 
compliance with Canada’s binding obligations under international law where the express 
words are capable of supporting such a construction.”63 By this logic, in light of its 
determination that the language of section 32(1) is ambiguous, international law—
specifically the principle of sovereign equality—can therefore fill that gap. Though the 
Court has for some time recognized that “customary rules of international law are 
directly incorporated into Canadian domestic law unless explicitly ousted by contrary 
legislation,”64 it is an entirely novel proposition to suggest that Canada’s own 
Constitution should conform to international law.65 There are three compelling 
reasons—one specific to section 32(1) and two more generally applicable to the 
Constitution—for rejecting this rule of interpretation. 
First, the interpretation given by the Court to the phrase “within the authority of 
Parliament” fails to take account of its own prior understanding of the purpose of that 
language. References to “authority of Parliament” and “the legislature of each province” 
in section 32(1) “are merely a reference to the division of powers in ss. 91 and 92 of the 
Constitution Act, 1867,” as the Court itself concluded in the early days of the Charter.66 
In other words, the language was intended to avoid the possibility that one level of 
government might seek to justify its encroachment on the legislative sphere of another 
level of government on the basis that it needed to act to uphold the Charter.67 To now 
read additional meaning into that language, as the majority in Hape does, thus creates 
and exploits a textual ambiguity that did not previously exist. 
                                                       
62 Hape, supra note 3 at para 39 (“Parliamentary sovereignty dictates that a legislature may violate 
international law, but that it must do so expressly”); para 53 (“[T]he legislature is presumed to 
comply with the values and principles of customary and conventional international law. … The 
presumption is rebuttable, however”); and para 68 (“By virtue of parliamentary sovereignty, it is 
open to Parliament to enact legislation that is inconsistent with those principles, but in so doing it 
would violate international law and offend the comity of nations”). 
 See also Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Canadian 
Assn of Internet Providers, 2004 SCC 45 at para 141, [2004] 2 SCR 427; Reference re 
Newfoundland Continental Shelf, [1984] 1 SCR 86 at 103, 5 DLR (4th) 385; and Reference re 
Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia, [1967] SCR 792 at 816, 65 DLR (2d) 353. 
 The Judicial Committee of the Privacy Council has also held that Parliament is fully 
competent to pass legislation with extraterritorial effect. Croft v Dunphy, [1933] AC 156. 
63 Hape, ibid at para 56. 
64 Ibid at para 37, citing Bouzari v Islamic Republic of Iran (2004), 71 OR (3d) 675 at para 65, 243 
DLR (4th) 406 (CA). 
65 Currie, “Tortured Determinations,” supra note 5 at 315. I would add using international law as 
an aid to interpret the meaning of the Charter is a distinct animal from what the majority does in 
Hape, which is concluding that the Charter must conform to international law. 
66 Operation Dismantle v The Queen, [1985] 1 SCR 441 at 463-64, 18 DLR (4th) 481 [Operation 
Dismantle]. 
67 Stribopoulos, supra note 46. 
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Second, there is a firm basis to adopt different approaches to the interpretation of 
ordinary statutes and the Constitution. The Charter, self-evidently, is no ordinary law, 
neither from a hierarchical perspective or a linguistic perspective. In contrast to most 
ordinary statues, which speak in relative detail and with precision, the Charter’s prose is 
purposely broad and even vague. Any ambiguity in section 32(1) is therefore to be 
interpreted, as one scholar has termed it, as “a meaningful silence.”68 International law 
can, of course, be an aid to interpreting the scope of the Charter, just as it has been an 
aid in interpreting the scope of its specific guarantees.69 But the Court should also look 
to its traditional methodological approach to Charter interpretation: The Court has long 
recognized it as “obvious” that the Charter is “a purposive document.”70 Justice Dickson 
(as he then was), writing for a unanimous Court in Hunter v Southam, concluded that 
“[i]ts purpose is to guarantee and to protect, within the limits of reason, the enjoyment of 
the rights and freedoms it enshrines.”71 By way of example, in Operation Dismantle v 
The Queen,72 the Court was urged to reject the notion that government action taken 
pursuant to the royal prerogative was outside the “authority of Parliament” and thus not 
subject to Charter scrutiny. The Court correctly rejected this argument. Justice Wilson 
could find “no reason in principle to distinguish between cabinet decisions made 
pursuant to statutory authority and those made in the exercise of the royal prerogative, 
and since the former clearly fall within the ambit of the Charter, I conclude that the 
latter do so also.”73 The majority’s opinion in Hape, however, makes no allowance for 
such a purposive interpretation.  
Third and finally, the interpretative approach adopted by the Court may 
undemocratically limit Canada’s own sovereignty. As part of the Constitution, the 
Charter is a part of “the fundamental law of the nation, effectively removed from 
legislative whim or any practicable ability to repeal or amend.”74 Yet, the decision in 
Hape implicitly suggests the meaning given to ambiguities and silences in the Charter 
will automatically evolve independent of any democratic decision by the Canadian 
people as a result of developments in international law in which Canada may have no 
                                                       
68 Ibid. 
69 See e.g., Slaight Communications v Davidson, [1989] 1 SCR 1038 at 1056, 59 DLR (4th) 416; 
Health Services and Support – Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn v British Columbia, 2007 
SCC 27 at para 70, [2007] 2 SCR 391 (“the Charter should be presumed to provide at least as 
great a level of protection as is found in the international human rights documents that Canada has 
ratified”). Both cases cite Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta), [1987] 1 
SCR 313 at 359, 38 DLR (4th) 161 (Dickson CJ, dissenting) (“I believe that the Charter should 
generally be presumed to provide protection at least as great as that afforded by similar provisions 
in international human rights documents which Canada has ratified”). 
70 Canada (Combines Investigation Branch, Director of Investigation and Research) v Southam, 
[1984] 2 SCR 145 at para 19 (WL) (sub nom Hunter v Southam), 11 DLR (4th) 641 [Hunter]. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Operation Dismantle, supra note 66 at para 463-64. 
73 Ibid at para 50. Though Wilson J wrote separately, the remaining members of the Court were in 
agreement on the point of the Charter’s applicability. Dickson J (as he then was) concluded for 
them: “I have no doubt that the executive branch of the Canadian government is duty bound to act 
in accordance with the dictates of the Charter” at para 28. 
74 Fairley, supra note 19 at 235. 
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hand.75 If this is indeed the case, the Court has opened the door to an alarming abdication 
of Canadian sovereignty. 
C. THE PARADOX OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS EXCEPTION 
Even if one takes the majority’s view of the law of jurisdiction as correct, the judgement 
in Hape now suffers from a confounding logical flaw stemming from what has been 
called the fundamental human rights exception. The possibility of such an exception was 
first hinted at in Hape but only articulated fully in Khadr.76 In the latter case, the 
Court—in a per curiam opinion—pointed to Hape as recognizing an “important 
exception” to the general rule of the Charter’s inapplicability abroad.77 According to the 
Court, Hape held that “if Canada was participating in a process that was violative of 
Canada’s binding obligations under international law, the Charter applies to the extent 
of that participation.”78 This assertion is baffling and leaves Hape in a state of self-
contradiction. Indeed, Justice Binnie’s admonition in Hape that “[t]he law of the 
Constitution can only ‘grow and evolve’ if the Court leaves it the flexibility to do so” 
appears remarkably prescient in light of Khadr. 
The Court in Khadr describes the human rights exception “an important exception to the 
principle of comity.”79 It is worth recalling, however, that the majority’s decision in 
Hape did not rest on comity alone, but on two separate bases: first, the binding principle 
of sovereign equality80 (or, more specifically, that Canada cannot assert extraterritorial 
enforcement jurisdiction without violating international law) and second, the related 
determination that extraterritorial application of the Charter was outside the authority of 
Parliament.81 The non-binding principle of comity merely provided a supplementary 
basis for confirming the conclusions reached on other grounds.82 Though it is evident 
why another state’s breach of international law might negate fidelity to comity to that 
state, the Court—neither in Hape nor in Khadr—offers any explanation for how such a 
breach justifies an exception to the binding principle of sovereign equality. Indeed, the 
Court does not even claim that there is an exception to these binding principles: 
                                                       
75 One might respond to this argument by pointing out that it is open to Parliament to pass a law 
extending the application of the Charter extraterritorially. This is a legally possible outcome; see 
notes 60 and 63, above. Whether it is politically probable, however, is a separate question. 
76 See Hape, supra note 3 at para 101 (“I would leave open the possibility that, in a future case, 
participation by Canadian officers in activities in another country that would violate Canada’s 
international human rights obligations might justify a remedy under s 24(1) of the Charter because 
of the impact of those activities on Charter rights in Canada”); Khadr, supra note 50 at paras 18-
19.  
77 Khadr, ibid at para 18. 
78 Ibid at para 19. 
79 Ibid at para 18. 
80 See discussion in Part I(A), above. 
81 See discussion in Part I(B), above. 
82 Hape, supra note 3 at para 47 (“comity is more a principle of interpretation than a rule of law, 
because it does not arise from formal obligations”). 
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[The] conclusion [in Hape that the Charter does not apply] was based 
[first] on international law principles against extraterritorial enforcement 
of domestic laws and [second] the principle of comity which implies 
acceptance of foreign laws and procedures when Canadian officials are 
operating abroad. 
In Hape, however, the Court stated an important exception to the principle 
of comity … 83  
The inability to offer an exception is not surprising given the Court’s own admission that 
it was split on the application of sovereign equality in Hape.84 Nevertheless, judging 
from the silence in Khadr, the dictate of sovereignty equality—that there cannot be any 
extraterritorial enforcement of the Charter—ostensibly remains sound. The problem, of 
course, is that the majority decision in Hape posits—albeit incorrectly—that 
extraterritorial enforcement is a prerequisite for Charter applicability; without such 
enforcement, the application of the Charter is “impossible.”85 And yet, notwithstanding 
this impossibility, the Charter applies in Khadr. Crucially, the Court in Khadr, though 
perhaps silently recognizing the flaw in Hape, makes no attempt to explain the sorely 
contorted state in which it has left that decision.  
Separately, nowhere in Khadr are we told how Canada’s participation in a process that 
violates international law somehow legalizes extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction and 
consequently makes the assertion of such jurisdiction a matter within the authority of 
Parliament.86 Of course, though it is open for Parliament to throw its binding obligations 
of international law to the wind, the Court has voluntarily bound itself in Hape to 
interpreting the Charter in a manner that conforms to international law.87 Accordingly, 
even though comity may be moot, the problems associated with the application of 
sovereign equality and authority of Parliament are very much still alive. Again, 
notwithstanding all of this, the Court crafted a remedy in Khadr. Where does this leave 
us?  
First, the teachings of Hape are now in contradiction with one another. Setting aside that 
the majority was wrong in its assessment that application of the Charter amounted to 
                                                       
83 Khadr, supra note 50 at paras 17-18. 
84 Khadr, ibid at para 18 (“While not unanimous on all the principles governing extraterritorial 
application of the Charter, the Court was united on the principle that comity cannot be used to 
justify Canadian participation in activities of a foreign state or its agents that are contrary to 
Canada’s international obligations”). 
85 Hape, supra note 3 at para 85 (“Since extraterritorial enforcement is not possible, and 
enforcement is necessary for the Charter to apply, extraterritorial application of the Charter is 
impossible”). 
86 There are other problems as well. For example, what happens if Canada is the sole participant in 
the violative process, assuming that the state on whose territory Canadian officials are operating 
are wholly unaware of what Canada is doing? Surely this would not deny an obligation of 
Canadian comity toward that state. Arguably, though, the need for a Charter remedy would be 
stronger. 
87 See discussion in Part I(B), above. 
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prohibited extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction, any conflicting principles in Hape 
could be reconciled prior to Khadr. Even if a violation of international law negated any 
obligation of comity, Hape makes clear that binding principles of international law 
would still prohibit extraterritorial enforcement of the Charter. As such, no matter what 
the circumstance, the application of the Charter abroad was, as the majority concluded, 
“impossible.”88 Khadr, however, in purporting to apply an exception created in Hape, 
has turned a piece of dicta into the whole substance of Hape.89 The Court’s opinion 
completely sidesteps the question of how its decision to apply the Charter in Khadr can 
surmount the concrete hurdles the Court itself created in Hape. We know now, however, 
that extraterritorial application of the Charter is at once “impossible” and possible.90  
It bears noting that in Amnesty International v Canada (Canadian Forces),91 the only 
case to consider the doctrine established in Hape prior to the Supreme Court’s 
subsequent decision in Khadr, Justice MacTavish of the Federal Court dismissed an 
argument for the recognition of a “fundamental human rights” exception for the very 
reasons highlighted above: 
310 Surely Canadian law, including the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, either applies in relation to the detention of individuals by the 
Canadian Forces in Afghanistan, or it does not. It cannot be that the 
Charter will not apply where the breach of a detainee’s purported Charter 
rights is of a minor or technical nature, but will apply where the breach 
puts the detainee’s fundamental human rights at risk. 
311 That is, it cannot be that it is the nature or quality of the Charter 
breach that creates extra-territorial jurisdiction, where it does not 
otherwise exist. That would be a completely unprincipled approach to the 
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
312 I agree with the [government] that to find that the Charter applies, 
where Charter jurisdiction does not otherwise exist, as a result of the 
gravity of the impugned actions or their effects, conflates the question of 
the existence of Charter jurisdiction with the question of whether a 
fundamental right has been infringed.92 
Speculation is, of course, a risky enterprise, but it is perhaps telling that the Federal 
Court of Appeal, which had the occasion to affirm the Federal Court’s decision in 
Amnesty after the Supreme Court’s holding in Khadr, declined the opportunity to 
                                                       
88 Hape, supra note 3 at para 85. 
89 As Attaran has noted, “that the precedential weight of the formerly obiter dicta exception has 
now overtaken the rest of Hape.” Supra note 7 at 520. 
90 Hape, supra note 3 at para 85. 
91 Amnesty International Canada v Canada (Canadian Forces), 2008 FC 336, [2008] 4 FCR 546 
[Amnesty (FC)]. 
92 Ibid at paras 310-12. 
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comment on the problems created by a fundamental human rights exception as noted by 
Justice MacTavish.93 
Moreover, the approach in Khadr places the question of whether a breach of 
international human rights law occurred ahead of the threshold question of whether the 
Charter applies in the first instance. Allowing the question of a rights breach to usurp the 
threshold question of Charter applicability has “an odd cart-before-the-horse feel to it.”94 
Indeed, if this criticism is valid, the opinion of Justice MacTavish in Amnesty is prescient 
in concluding that the recognition of a fundamental human rights exception results in a 
“sort of ‘cause and effect’ approach … that conflate[s] the question of jurisdiction with 
the question of whether an individual’s rights had been violated.”95  
II. A PATH FORWARD 
The decision in Hape is premised on conclusions regarding the international law of 
jurisdiction. Putting aside for a moment the problem, as I attempted to show above, that 
these conclusions are flawed as matter of law, the Court’s focus on jurisdiction as a 
starting point for determining whether the Charter can be applied abroad is misplaced. 
The concept of jurisdiction is better suited to the question of how a state can assert itself 
(for example, by criminalizing particular conduct) as opposed to whether others can 
assert rights against the state (for example, by making a claim for a rights violation). A 
better lens through which to tackle the question of extraterritoriality of the Charter is 
thus the doctrine of state responsibility, a long-standing concept in international law. 
Indeed, as a review of emerging jurisprudence in Europe and the United States shows, 
foreign high courts are reaching sharply different conclusions on the question of 
constitutional extraterritoriality than the Supreme Court of Canada, largely untroubled 
by concerns about jurisdiction. 
D. CONSTITUTIONS ARE DIFFERENT 
Any discussion of extraterritoriality is amiss without mention of the classic scenario of 
smoking in Paris. In this example, which is discussed by the majority in Hape,96 
Parliament might pass legislation making it a criminal offence for Canadian nationals, or 
perhaps even all persons, to smoke in the streets of Paris, thereby exercising 
extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction on the basis of nationality. The prohibition, 
especially if it includes all persons walking the streets, quite obviously raises questions 
of sovereign equality and comity, but it is nevertheless prima facie legal.97 Of course, 
should Canadian police officers march into Paris and began arresting all smokers—a 
                                                       
93 Amnesty International Canada v Canada (Canadian Forces), 2008 FCA 401, [2009] 4 FCR 149 
[Amnesty (FCA)]. 
94 Attaran, supra note 7 at 520. 
95 Amnesty (FC), supra note 91 at para 313. 
96 Hape, supra note 3 at para 63. 
97 See discussion in Part I(A), above. 
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clear act of extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction—that would be illegal under 
international law. 
The smoking in Paris analogy, however, breaks down in the context of the 
extraterritorial application of the constitutional rights. Professor Attaran has attempted to 
explain it this way: “Can it honestly be imagined that if the RCMP were frisking 
Canadians for tobacco on the Champs-Élysées without French consent, but Canada 
sought to restore comity by stripping those Canadians of their Charter rights [to bring an 
action against their government in a Canadian court], suddenly the French would breathe 
a sigh of relief and stop being irritated?”98 In other words, the important point here is 
that extraterritorial application of the Charter is a rights-conferring act, while 
extraterritorial application of other laws is a rights-negating act: Criminalizing smoking 
in Paris takes away Parisians’ rights, whereas extending the Charter to cover the actions 
of Canadian officials in Paris confers on them rights, albeit rights enforceable only in a 
Canadian court.99  
An obvious question then is how one should conceptualize a rights-conferring act. 
Jurisdiction is still a factor, since the very act of conferring rights on persons abroad is 
an act of extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction. The doctrine of state responsibility, 
however, is more directly relevant, as I will show in the next section. 
E. LOOKING TO STATE RESPONSIBILITY 
The doctrine of state responsibility is intended to provide accountability for instances 
when states break their international legal obligations. It may be useful to think of the 
concept “as akin to the legal principles of liability for wrongful acts found in most 
domestic legal systems.”100 Crucially, as Ian Brownlie has observed, “[r]esponsibility is 
the necessary corollary of a right.”101 Accordingly, when an international right is 
breached by a state, the state is obligated, under the doctrine of state responsibility, to 
make amends. It is also worth observing that state responsibility is a concept of general 
application, “meaning that it is of potential relevance in virtually all substantive 
international legal contexts.”102  
In 2001, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution concerning “internationally 
wrongful acts.”103 The resolution included the text of the draft articles of state 
responsibility, which constituted the work of over half a century of the International Law 
Commission (“ILC”), a body set up by the General Assembly in 1948 as a step toward 
                                                       
98 Attaran, supra note 7 at 527. 
99 Bastarache J essentially makes the same point for the Hape minority: “[T]here [is] no 
interference or ‘conflict’ with sovereign authority when Canadian officials are subject to the 
Charter because the Charter does not mandate specific conduct, but rather imposes certain limits 
on the conduct of government officials.” Supra note 3 at para 162. 
100 Currie, Public International Law, supra note 35 at 533. 
101 Brownlie, supra note 39 at 435. 
102 Currie, Public International Law, supra note 35 at 533. 
103 Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, GA Res 56/83, UNGAOR, 56th Sess, 
UN Doc A/Res/56/83 (2002) [GA Res 56/83]. 
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its aspiration of “encouraging the progressive development of international law and its 
codification.”104 In its resolution, the General Assembly only noted the draft articles, 
meaning they lack legal force and are accordingly non-binding. Nevertheless, the body 
did state that it “commends [the articles] to the attention of Governments.”105 Article 4, 
for example, states: 
The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State 
under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, 
judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds in the 
organization of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of the 
central Government or of a territorial unit of the State. 
Article 6 attributes responsibility for the actions of any “organ” that contravenes 
international law to a state “if the organ is acting in the exercise of elements of the 
governmental authority of the State at whose disposal it is placed.” Similarly, Article 8 
attributes responsibility for the actions of any person to a state “if the person or group of 
persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that 
State in carrying out the conduct.” Professor Attaran has observed that these doctrines 
are “almost identical” to the teachings of the Supreme Court concerning Charter 
applicability in RWDSU v Dolphin Delivery and its progeny.106 The lesson here is that 
the UN system has endorsed principles which suggest that states should be held 
responsible for their illegal actions, whether undertaken by the state itself or through 
agents authorized by it. Such a principle is hardly foreign to the underlying values of the 
Charter. 
The remaining question then concerns how states can be held accountable for such acts. 
Here there is an emerging notion that a state’s own judicial system can take 
responsibility for violations of international law committed by that state’s own actors. 
The International Criminal Court (“ICC”)—an institution whose creation Canada 
ardently backed—is precisely such a forum. Genocide, crimes against humanity and 
other international crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction are investigated and prosecuted 
only after national courts have acted inappropriately or have altogether failed to act; the 
ICC, in other words, is a court of last resort. Article 17 of the Rome Statute, the ICC’s 
constating document, makes plain that a case shall be “inadmissible” if the matter “is 
being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it” or if it “has 
been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not 
to prosecute the person concerned.”107 
                                                       
104 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can TS 1945 No 7, Art 13(a); Establishment of 
an International Law Commission, GA Res 174 (II), UNGAOR, 2d Sess, UN Doc A/519 (1947). 
105 GA Res 56/83, supra note 103. 
106 Attaran, supra note 7 at 532. See also RWDSU v Dolphin Delivery, [1986] 2 SCR 573, 33 DLR 
(4th) 174; McKinney v University of Guelph, [1990] 3 SCR 229, 76 DLR (4th) 545; and 
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107 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 3, art 17(1) 
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The Rome Statute thus reflects the codification of the principle of “complementarity,” 
whereby individual states have a primary obligation under international law—and 
potentially a sovereign right—to prosecute international crimes. Complementarity 
attempts to strike a balance by ensuring a forum for the prosecution of international 
crimes without eroding or violating state sovereignty. Indeed, upon assuming office in 
2003, the ICC’s chief prosecutor stated that, “[a]s a consequence of complementarity, 
the number of cases that reach the Court should not be a measure of its efficiency. On 
the contrary, the absence of trials before this Court, as a consequence of the regular 
functioning of national institutions, would be a major success.”108 Some scholars have 
gone so far as to suggest that “the ICC could participate more directly in efforts to 
encourage national governments to prosecute international crimes themselves.”109 
In discussing the ICC, my point here is merely to illustrate that international law 
recognizes the valuable role that national courts play in ensuring state accountability by 
undertaking the adjudication of violations of international human rights law. Notably, 
the adjudication in such cases is conducted under domestic laws, which though similar in 
what they criminalize,110 are technically distinct from international law. I note this 
because it suggests that a Canadian court could, by the same logic, adjudicate an 
infringement of Charter rights, which are quite similar to international human rights 
obligations,111 as a mechanism of ensuring accountability of the actions of Canada and 
its agents.112 Indeed, this is precisely what European and American courts have done in 
their own contexts. 
F. LESSONS FROM ABROAD 
Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) places an obligation 
on its member states to “secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and 
freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.”113 The language is quite similar to 
that of section 32(1), though diction concerning “authority of Parliament” is arguably 
                                                       
108 Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Statement Made at the Ceremony for the Solemn Undertaking of the 
Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (16 June 2003), cited in William W Burke-
White, “Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and National Courts in the 
Rome System of International Justice” (2008) 49 Harv J Int’l L 53 at 55. 
109 Burke-White, ibid at 54. Others, however, have cautioned that too much deference to national 
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See e.g., Kevin Jon Heller, “The Shadow Side of Complementarity: The Effect of Article 17 of the 
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110 Mark S Ellis, “The International Criminal Court and its Implications for Domestic Law and 
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111 See note 70, above. 
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213 UNTS 221, art 1. 
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broader. Accordingly, the European Court of Human Rights’ interpretation of Article 1 
can be instructive for our purposes.  
Like the Supreme Court of Canada in Hape, the European Court has recognized that “the 
jurisdictional competence of a state is primarily territorial.”114 That said, the European 
Court has also recognized that “the principles underlying the convention cannot be 
interpreted and applied in a vacuum” and that there are thus “other bases of jurisdiction” 
which are “exceptional and requiring special justification in the particular circumstances 
of each case.”115 What emerges, keeping with Article 4 of the ILC’s draft articles, is a 
concern by the European Court that the applicability of the ECHR depends on the de 
facto issue of which state is responsible for particular conduct, the answer to which may 
be altogether different from which states exercises de jure sovereignty over the area 
where the impugned conduct occurred.116 
The European Court has thus recognized two separate heads of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction.117 The first stems from state agent authority (SAA),118 where “persons who 
are in the territory of another State but who are found to be under [the first] State’s 
authority and control through its agents operating—whether lawfully or unlawfully—in 
the latter State.”119 Jurisdiction here is justified on the basis that the ECHR “cannot be 
interpreted so as to allow a State party to perpetrate violations of the Convention on the 
territory of another State, which it could not perpetrate on its own territory.”120 European 
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courts have applied SAA principles on at least two occasions. In the first case, a British 
court found the ECHR was applicable to the case of an Iraqi citizen who was arrested 
and subsequently died while being held in a British military prison in Iraq.121 In the 
second case, the ECHR would have been applied to the case of six Iraqi civilians 
tortured and killed by Turkish troops had the facts alleged been proven.122 Notably, both 
examples bear some broad similarities to the facts of Amnesty, discussed earlier. 
The second head of extraterritorial jurisdiction stems from the effective control of an 
area (ECA), where a state through “the effective control of the relevant territory and its 
inhabitants abroad as a consequence of military occupation or through the consent, 
invitation or acquiescence of the government of that territory, exercises all or some of 
the public powers normally to be exercised by that government.”123 The rationale here is 
obvious and accords perfectly with the principles of state responsibility articulated in the 
ILC articles. It is for the same reason broader than the SAA rule: “Where a Contracting 
State exercises overall control over an area outside its national territory its responsibility 
is not confined to the acts of its soldiers or officials in that area but also extends to acts 
of the local administration which survives there by virtue of its military and other 
support.”124 Deploying ECA principles, the European Court determined that the torture 
of several individuals arrested by local officials in a secessionist enclave in Moldova 
could be attributed to Russia as a result of Russia’s military presence in that area. The 
court reasoned that Russia had effective control of the region, and thus responsibility for 
all state actors within it, even though Moldova retained de jure sovereignty.125 
The US Supreme Court has used reasoning similar to that of the European Court of 
Human Rights in justifying its application of the writ of habeas corpus to individuals 
detained by the US government at Guantanamo Bay. Though the court did not doubt the 
US government’s assertion that “Cuba, not the United States, maintains sovereignty, in 
the legal and technical sense of the term, over Guantanamo Bay,” that fact “does not end 
the analysis.”126 In language strikingly similar to that of the European Court, the US 
Supreme Court in Boumediene v Bush noted that the detainees are “held in a territory 
that, while technically not part of the United States, is under the complete and total 
control of our Government.”127 That fact, combined with a determination that extension 
of the writ posed no insurmountable practical obstacles, led the Court to conclude that 
the relevant portion of the US Constitution “has full effect at Guantanamo Bay.”128 
American appellate courts, however, have been reluctant to adopt the more expansive 
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implications of the European SAA doctrine,129 though no case involving this question 
has yet reached the US Supreme Court. 
An analysis of European and American jurisprudence thus shows that foreign high 
courts, charged with giving meaning to human rights guarantees much like the Charter, 
have come to fundamentally different conclusions as to international jurisdiction. Most 
notably, concerns about extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction are completely non-
existent. Mindful nevertheless of the need to balance extraterritorial prescriptive 
jurisdiction that recognizes state responsibility on the one hand, with sovereign equality 
and comity on the other, these courts instead have devised control-based tests to 
determine whether domestic human rights protections apply extraterritorially to entire 
areas where the state exercises control. The European Court of Human Rights has gone 
further by extending extraterritorial applicability to actions taken by authorized state 
agents regardless of whether the state itself exercised effective control over the area. 
These approaches can be instructive for Canada.130 
III. RECONCILIATION 
The discussion thus far as it relates to the jurisprudence on the extraterritorial 
applicability of the Charter in Hape has been unfortunately negative. I have argued, first, 
that the majority opinion in Hape is based on flawed conclusions about the nature of 
international law—conclusions, notably, that foreign high courts have not reached. 
Second, the fundamental human rights exception as articulated in Khadr undermines the 
very legs that Hape stands on by suggesting extraterritorial application is no longer 
impossible by virtue of Canada’s participation in a process that breaches international 
law. Quite simply, the conclusion in Khadr cannot be reconciled with the reasoning in 
Hape. 
It should perhaps not be surprising, however, that the conclusion in Khadr is more easily 
reconcilable with the minority opinion in Hape. Recall that though the judgement in 
Hape was split five to four, the opinion in Khadr was unanimous and unsigned. One can 
reasonably infer that a per curiam opinion was at least in part symbolic: The Court was 
speaking with one voice on a highly contentious issue that had dominated public 
discourse for years. One is left to wonder whether the price of unanimity was an opinion 
that, while undermining the logic of the majority opinion in Hape, accords more 
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harmoniously—in substance, if not form—with the approach adopted by the minority, 
which itself accorded with the Court’s past precedents in cases such as R v Cook.131 
The minority opinion in Hape, in contrast to the majority, expressly declined to use 
international law as a “vehicle” for interpreting section 32(1).132 Rather, the minority 
saw it as patently obvious that the Charter applied to all actions of the Canadian 
government, at home or abroad.133 At the same time, the minority recognized that 
“differences resulting from different legal regimes and different approaches adopted in 
other democratic societies will usually be justified given the international context, the 
need to fight transnational crime and the need to respect the sovereign authority of other 
states, coupled with the fact that it is impossible for Canadian officials to follow their 
own procedures in those circumstances.”134  
Accordingly, the minority proposes an approach whereby the onus will be on the 
claimant to “demonstrate that the difference between fundamental human rights 
protection given by the local law and that afforded under the Charter is inconsistent with 
basic Canadian values; the onus will then shift to the government to justify its 
involvement in the activity.”135 In deference to comity and the principle of sovereign 
equality, courts could “apply a rebuttable presumption of Charter compliance where the 
Canadian officials were acting pursuant to valid foreign laws and procedures.”136 Only 
acts that are “substantially inconsistent with the fundamental principles emanating from 
the Charter” would then breach the Charter, requiring justification under section 1.137 
The approach advocated by the minority opinion in Hape is salutary for two reasons. 
First, the result in Khadr and its progeny, which together make up the most recent case 
law on the Charter’s application abroad, accords with the approach adopted by the 
minority. Though the Court did not proceed through the several steps that would form 
part of the minority’s suggested approach, the substantive outcome—that there was a 
violation of international rights that also offended the fundamental principles of the 
Charter—is the same. More broadly, though, the minority approach offers a clearer and 
more principled approach to the exception recognized in Khadr by starting with the 
premise that that the government and its agents must act within justifiable bounds of the 
Charter, which bounds will be informed not only by their domestic application but also 
by an analysis of the international context. 
Second, the minority opinion is also consonant with the principle of state responsibility. 
Indeed, the minority’s approach, which goes beyond the more restricted ECA and SAA 
doctrines espoused by the European Court of Human Rights, would arguably make 
Canada a leader among states that provide a meaningful avenue for justice to those who 
have suffered a deprivation of rights at the hands of national governments. It would be a 
significant step in transforming state commitments to international human rights from 
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“utopian ideals that have little bearing on the way states actually behave” to an 
enforceable promise.138 It is thus regrettable that the Supreme Court in 2009 did not 
grant leave to appeal in Amnesty,139 which would have been a fine opportunity to revisit 
Hape in light of the lessons of Khadr. Under the minority approach, it seems reasonable 
that the Court could have found the Charter to apply to the Canadian Forces’ actions 
with respect to the Afghan detainees, but left for any subsequent action the question of 
whether the Canadian government was violating international standards for the treatment 
of detainees, which would presumably run afoul of section 7 of the Charter.140 
It bears noting that the minority’s approach to extraterritorial application of the Charter 
breaks new ground and will no doubt raise some challenging questions in the future. But 
there is little reason to doubt that the Court will be able to evolve its approach over time 
as needed, much as it has with the rest of its Charter jurisprudence. As Professor Roach 
has observed, “If courts can tailor Charter requirements to the regulatory context, it is 
difficult to understand why they cannot make adjustments for the foreign context.”141 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Lord MacMillan, the Scottish jurist, once remarked that “[w]here … so much depends 
upon the avenue of approach to the question, it is very easy to take the wrong 
turning.”142 As I have endeavoured to demonstrate here, in its decision in Hape, the 
Supreme Court of Canada took the wrong turning: Interpreting the scope of the 
Charter’s applicability solely through the lens of jurisdiction focuses on merely a limited 
subset of the jurisprudence properly brought to bear for this important task. Instead, the 
Court should have had regard for the emerging principles of state responsibility and it 
should have placed greater weight on the values underlying the Charter. 
It is crucial to remember what is at stake here. The majority in Hape places much 
emphasis on the importance of Canada’s ability to contribute to the fight against 
transnational crime. No doubt one should be mindful of the potential that the 
extraterritorial applicability of the Charter may have the effect of restricting Canadian 
officials’ participation in certain foreign activities. Under some circumstances, such 
restrictions might even “fall short not only of Canada’s commitment to other states and 
the international community to provide assistance in combating transnational crime, but 
also of Canada’s obligation to Canadians to ensure that crimes having a connection with 
Canada are investigated and prosecuted.”143 I share the view that facilitating an 
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appropriate role for Canada in combating global crime—or terrorism—is a laudable 
goal. But as Justice Bastarache observed for the minority in Hape, “I fail to see how the 
Charter prevents us from taking into account this important societal need while holding 
Canadian officers to their obligation to respect fundamental Canadian values.”144 
There is another important lesson in Hape. As I have stressed, Khadr underscores 
fundamental problems with the internal logic of the case and suggests that Hape is a 
judgment that will not endure the test of time. The lesson then is one of judicial 
minimalism: The Court should have declined the opportunity to reshape its section 32 
jurisprudence on the back of a relatively uncomplicated case, when much more 
complex—and controversial—cases were not far off on the horizon. One lone justice 
made this point in Hape.145 Prudence counsels that the Court must not make “far-
reaching pronouncements” before it is required to do so, lest it forget, “There are more 
things in heaven and earth, Horatio, Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.”146 
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